

1 sinister side to the management of the mine beyond
2 incompetence and neglect. Experienced coal miners were
3 lured to the mine by the false promise of a solid
4 sandstone roof. And when they learned of the reality, it
5 was too late for most of them to leave.

6 Inexperienced men who sometimes didn't know better
7 were assigned to the dangerous job of bolting the roof.
8 And if they didn't meet performance targets, they were
9 subjected to abuse by the underground manager.

10 If you questioned what was going on, you were
11 reminded of all the people who put applications in the
12 office on surface. And anyone who complained was
13 threatened with dismissal.

14 Operational decisions could only be made at the top,
15 and any supervisor who acted on his own put his job at
16 risk.

17 However, Mr. Commissioner, it would be wrong to
18 suggest that Westray or Curragh were rogue companies that
19 can be set aside as anomalies. They were part of the
20 Canadian mining industry. Their executives were leading
21 lights in that industry. And in a sense, the industry as
22 a whole must bear some responsibility for what happened
23 here. And in this sense, Mr. Commissioner, we regret the
24 fact that the Coal Association of Canada and the Canadian
25 Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum refused