

1 hastily without full appreciation of the conditions that
2 would be encountered there.

3 And the inability to control the roof in the
4 Southwest section led to the adoption and abandonment of
5 a series of mine plans and ultimately an attempt to
6 implement an unusual, if not radical, pillar design in
7 the district.

8 And finally, the decision to persist in the
9 Southwest section after the narrow pillars had failed led
10 to the development of the Southwest 2 area.

11 Each of these decisions appears to have been made in
12 haste, under pressure for production.

13 And you see the same factors, Mr. Commissioner,
14 haste and a priority for production over safety, when you
15 review other decisions in the mine. The direction to
16 refuel diesel equipment underground instead of on
17 surface, the routine use of welding and cutting torches
18 underground, the absence of preventative maintenance, the
19 blocking of ventilation tubes, the dangerous efforts to
20 remove equipment from the Southwest 1 panel after it had
21 failed, and the refusal to assign production personnel to
22 stone dusting, and the decision not to remove the gas
23 from the Southwest 1 section.

24 These were all operational decisions made by Westray
25 management that reflected the assignment of a higher